We consider a simple CAPM with heterogenous expectations on assets' mean returns and homogenous expectations on the covariance of returns. In this model alpha-opportunities naturally arise in a financial market equilibrium. We show that that the hunt for alpha-opportunities is a zero-sum game and that alpha-opportunities erode with the assets under management. Moreover, it is shown that a positive alpha is not necessarily a good criterion for the choice between active and passive investment. Finally, we argue that the standard CAPM with homogenous beliefs can be seen as the long run outcome of our model when investors' expectations are endogenous.
Introduction
The Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM, is a rich source of intuition and also the basis for many practical financial decisions. The asset pricing implication of the CAPM is the security market line, SML, according to which the excess return of any asset over the risk free rate is proportional to the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk free rate. The proportionality factor is the beta, i.e. the covariance of the asset's return to the return of the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio. The beta is the only risk factor that is rewarded according the CAPM. Hence an investor requiring a high expected return will have to accept a high beta. Some investors however want to achieve more. They claim to be able to achieve positive deviations of expected returns over those given by the SML. Those deviations of returns are referred to as Jensen's alpha or short as the "alpha." Indeed the alpha is nowadays a common term in the finance jargon. Hedge Funds for example consider themselves to be alpha generating strategies; many of them use the term "alpha" in their marketing brochures and some of them even as part of their name.
While many opinion leaders in the world of finance claim that the existence of alpha contradicts the validity of the CAPM, we argue in this paper that a simple extension of the CAPM towards heterogenous beliefs is already able to explain the alpha in a financial market equilibrium. The extension we use goes back to one of the CAPMs with heterogenous beliefs suggested by Lintner (1969) .
Because the most general CAPM with heterogenous beliefs becomes intractable we will use one of the Lintner-CAPMs in which investors have heterogenous beliefs over expected returns while they agree on the covariances of returns. The assumption of homogeneous covariance expectations is frequently used in the literature, but, of course, is a severe restriction to investors' beliefs. However, since the main purpose of the CAPM is to organize ideas, this assumption seems justified because it keeps the CAPM tractable. Moreover, many practitioners do portfolio allocations using historic covariances while adjusting historic means 1 The famous model of Brock and Hommes (1998) , for example, is based on mean-variance optimizing agents that have heterogenous beliefs on expected returns but agree on covariances.
This model does, however, only have one risky asset.
to get reasonable expected returns. Finally, in the CAPM means are first order effects while covariances capture second order effect. Hence mistakes in means hurt the investor more than equally sized mistakes in covariances (cf. Chopra and Ziemba (1993) ).
Our first result derives the security market line of the CAPM as an aggregation result without using the unrealistic two-fund-separation property. The security market line turns out to hold with respect to average expectations, where the weight of each investor is proportional to the investor's wealth divided by his risk aversion. Hence the more wealthy and the less risk averse an investor the more do his expectations determine the average expectations. In particular the often observed feature of underdiversification (see, for example, Odean (1999) , Goetzmann and Kumar (2005) and Polkovnichenko (2005) ) can well be compatible with optimal portfolio choice. If an investor has superior information then underdiversification can even be necessary to outperform the market! In our model alpha-opportunities can be explained as a feature of financial market equilibria.
The further the average expected returns deviate from the true returns the higher the alpha-opportunities. Moreover we can show that alpha-opportunities erode with the assets under management, which is a feature that has been observed for many active portfolio managers, as for example for hedge funds (cf. Getmansky (2004) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2005) ). In our model this important feature has a very simple explanation. The more wealth a strategy acquires the more it resembles the market portfolio, which, by definition, has an alpha of zero. Note that our model gives an equilibrium explanation of this feature that does not need to refer to any ad-hoc ideas of a production function for alpha opportunities (cf. Berk and Green (2004) ). Moreover, in our model the hunt for alpha-opportunities is a zero-sum game. If some investor generates a positive alpha there must be some other investor earning a negative alpha. Hence the ease to generate alpha opportunities depends on the sophistication of the other investors in the market. This feature may explain why hedge funds could generate very high returns during the stock market bubble of the turn of the millennium in which many unsophisticated investors took active bets. After the bubble burst, many unsophisticated investors left the market due to frustration and hedge fund returns decreased. We extend our model by endogenizing agents' information by allowing them to be either passive, in which case they invest according to the average expectation embodied in the market returns, or to be active, in which case they can acquire superior information at some cost. In our model we show that the decision of being active or passive depends on the efficiency of the market, the quality of the investor's belief, his degree of risk aversion and of course the costs for being
active. An investor is more inclined to be active the less efficient the market is, the better his information and the less risk averse he is. By contrast, it can be shown that expecting a positive alpha is not necessarily a good criterion for becoming active. We give simple examples pointing out that expecting a positive alpha from the active strategy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for becoming active. In our model, delegating active investment to portfolio managers only makes sense if the performance fee increases with the skill of the portfolio manager and is bounded above by some function of the degree of inefficiency of the market.
Our model provides new measures for both of these components. Finally, in our model it turns out that a market in which some investors acquire information to be active while the others get the average information for free from market prices cannot be a stable outcome. Moreover, all investors being passive may also not be an outcome that is stable with respect to information acquisition if the average expectation is far from the true returns. This result resembles the well know result of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) on the impossibility of informational efficient markets. Accounting for this stability requirement, the standard CAPM with homogenous and correct beliefs can be seen as the long run outcome of our model. Hence we can argue that alpha opportunities can arise in a financial market equilibrium as a reaction to a non-stationarity like an exogenous shock (invention of the railway, the mass production or the internet) but under sufficiently stationary exogenous conditions alpha-opportunities will vanish.
Our results give a common framework for many phenomena that have been discussed in the literature. Besides being able to address alpha-opportunities in a simple equilibrium framework, we can explain underdiversification, the erosion of alpha-opportunities as assets under management increase, and the structure of performance fees for active management. Moreover, our simple model gives a foundation of more applied research on active management like the one of Grinold and Kahn (2000) and Black and Litterman (cf. Litterman (2003) ). Our model provides a common ground for these two approaches whose methodologies seem to be in contradiction. While Grinold and Kahn (2000) argue for active portfolio management based on the mean-variance framework of Markowitz, Black and Litterman argue for active portfolio management based on the security market line. Black and Litterman assume that the security market line is a "center of gravity" towards which the financial markets tend over time. Hence an active Black-Litterman investor goes short in those assets that have realized a positive alpha because he infers from this that in the next period the return will most likely be decreasing. Our model gives support to this view since taking account for the optimal information acquisition in the long run all alphas will erode.
Our approach can also accommodate active portfolio management in the sense of Grinold and Kahn. As we show below, optimal mean-variance portfolios must lie on a security line which is the security market line in which market expectations have been replaced by individual expectations. The security market line is then obtained by the aggregation of these individual security lines. An active meanvariance investorà la Grinold and Kahn "sees" alpha opportunities because he holds a belief of expected returns that deviates from the average belief of the investors expressed in the security market line.
Of course we do not claim that our simple model can explain all features of active management. In particular some features related to hedge funds, as for example higher order returns, lead out of the mean-variance framework. However, since a simple CAPM with heterogenous beliefs carries us quite far in the understanding of many important features of active management this framework can give a first intuition for what active management is about.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a formal description of the CAPM with heterogenous beliefs and it derives the aggregation result of the SML. Then we allow the investors to choose whether they do active or passive portfolio management. In that section we derive the main criterion for active portfolio management based on the measures of market efficiency and the skill of the active managers. Furthermore we show which structure fees for active management should have. Thereafter we consider the alpha. We show the zero-sum property of alpha opportunities and that they erode with increasing asset under management. Moreover, we question whether expecting a positive alpha is an appropriate criterion for becoming active.
A CAPM with Heterogenous Beliefs
We consider a two periods financial market model with dates t = 0, 1, and k = 0, 1, . . . , K assets with payoffs A k ∈ R in t = 1. 
there are no redundant assets. Moreover, we assume that
..,K be the covariance matrix of asset payoffs, where
Since there are no redundant assets it follows that S is positive definite. 
where γ i > 0 measures investor i's risk aversion and µ and σ are the expected return and variance, respectively, of investor i's portfolio. We assume that investors do not know the distribution of asset payoffs but rather hold individual 2 A k is the cum-dividend price of asset k in t = 1. 3 Later we derive conditions on the exogenous parameters of our economy which guarantee that in equilibrium q k = 0 for all k. 4 Since investors are assumed to take asset prices q as given, we simplify the notation and do not explicitly writeμ and COV as functions of q.
beliefs over expected asset payoffs and the covariance matrix of asset payoffs.
More specifically, as it has been justified in the introduction, we assume that investors have heterogenous expectations about the average payoff of the assets, but homogenous and correct expectations about the covariance of payoffs. Let
k denotes i's expectation about average asset returns and COV is the common covariance matrix of returns.
where e = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R K . The (necessary and sufficient) first order condition for the solution λ i of (1) is
Given the portfolio of risky assets λ
The supply of each asset is normalized to 1 so that q k denotes the market capitalization of asset k and in equilibrium we have
Hence, from the agent's optimal portfolio choice (2) we obtain that
Solving for equilibrium asset prices q we obtain
and q k = 0 for all k if and only if i
3) resembles the main result of Lintner (1969) for the version of a CAPM with heterogeneous beliefs but common covariance expectations. However, Lintner (1969) did neither derive the SML nor did he address the alpha.
From now on we assume that in equilibrium k λ
The asset pricing implication of the standard CAPM is the security market line, SML, according to which the excess return of any asset over the risk free rate is proportional to the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk free rate.
The proportionality factor is the beta, i.e. the covariance of the asset's returns to the return of the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio.
In order to derive the security market line for our heterogenous expectations we need to specify how individual expectations are averaged to become the market expectation.
In our model it turns out that the appropriate aggregation rule is to define the average expectation for the return of asset k
Hence, every individual's expectation enters the average expectation proportional to the individual's wealth divided by his risk aversion. Accordingly letμ
) for all k be the average expectation of the market
Then we can state the Security Market Line Theorem for average expectations as:
5 Given (2) and (3) we can derive a condition on the exogenous parameters of our economy that guarantees that in equilibrium λ i 0 < 1 for all i.
Proposition 2.1 (Security Market Line for Average Expectations)
In equilibrium the risk premium of any asset k is proportional to the risk premium of the market portfolio under average expectations, where the factor of proportionality is given by the covariance of the return of asset k with the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio:
Proof: In order to derive the security market line for our heterogenous expectations economy we define the share of risky wealth as
for all assets k and all investors i. Using (2) this is equivalent to
Let w 
where
is the return of the market portfolio. To see this observe that
for all i. Hence, (6) is equivalent to
Multiplying with λ M k and summing over all k gives σ
the average expectation of the return of the market portfolio. Substituting this into (7) gives the Security Market Line for average expectations.
Coming back to the individual optimization recall that each investor chooses an investment strategy λ i that solves (5), i.e.
COV(R
Multiplying both sides of (9) withλ i k and summing over all k gives 
We see that an investor i will hold the market portfolio if µ Recall thatμ 
Clearly, a passive investor will hold the market portfolio of risky assets.
We assume that investors ex post observe the true expected returnsμ. 
Hence,
Observe that U 
The underlying idea is that investors do not revise their investment strategy frequently so that they get enough observations of the asset returns in order to get a very precise estimate of the true expected returns. 
With respect to this norm, U î µ (µ) is decreasing in the distance of µ toμ (the true expectations) as is shown in the following lemma.
Proof: Simple computation:
From Lemma 3.1 it follows that investor i choosesμ investor i is more inclined to be passive the more risk averse he is, the lower his skill, the higher his investment cost and the more efficient the market is.
Observe that µ all k to be the vector of true expected asset payoffs, then
which is independent of q. Similarly,
is independent of q. Since µ i −μ is independent of asset prices, the skill of investor i is independent of the portfolios chosen by other investors. Hence, the skill of an investor is a truly personal characteristic.
We are now in the position to define a stability notion of CAPM-equilibria with information acquisition. We say that a profile with heterogenous beliefs is stable if every investor has deviated from the average belief if and only if this is in line with his optimal information acquisition choice. In particular, at a stable profile of beliefs no investor has an incentive to modify his belief by acquiring information. Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction thatμ is stable and that {i :
Hence, (15) is violated for i = J contradicting the fact thatμ is stable.
Hence, we obtain the paradoxical result that there cannot be active investment in a stable market. Whether or not passive investment leads to a stable situation now depends on howμ (which is undetermined if all investors are passive) relates to the true beliefsμ: If the market is very "efficient," i.e. μ −μ is close to zero, then (15) is violated for all i, so that every investor being passive (μ i =μ for all i) is stable. If, on the contrary, μ −μ is large, so that there exists an investor i, for whom active investment is profitable, i.e. (14) is satisfied, then passive investment is not stable. In other words, the standard CAPM with homogenous beliefsμ that are close to the true beliefsμ according to the efficiency measure μ −μ , is the only stable outcome of our model. 
Now we are in a position to address the structure of performance fees that are in line with the information acquisition decision of the investors. We have seen that there cannot be active investment in the long run. In the short run, however, in particular if the true beliefμ changes, there is a potential for active investment if the market is inefficient, i.e. μ −μ large and the skill is high,
−μ is small. Suppose now that an investor cannot invest actively on his own but has to invest into a fund if he wants to be active. This fund sells a portfolio λ which, from the perspective of investor i, corresponds to the belief
COVλ, which follows from (2). The question then is, how the fee of the fund should look like in order to induce the investor to invest into the fund.
From our previous analysis we obtain two conditions:
(1) In order to give the fund manager the right incentives, the performance fee should be increasing in the skill of the manager, i.e. decreasing in µ
(2) In order for the investor to become active, the fee must be bounded above by a function that is decreasing in the risk aversion of the investor and in the efficiency of the market.
We get the following result:
, that is decreasing in µ −μ and that satisfies
fulfills these conditions.
Hence, the performance fee should reward the skill of the manager but should also discourage the manager to hunt for investment opportunities in efficient markets. Moreover, comparing agents with different degrees of risk aversion, we find that the more risk averse agents have a lower willingness to pay for active portfolio management and therefore are more inclined to be passive.
Before we close this section we address the issue of erosion of investment opportunities. We have seen that only passive investment is stable. Nevertheless, in the short run, for example, due to changes in the exogenous uncertainty, some investors may find it profitable to become active. We will now show that active investment is profitable only if the investor's wealth is small relative to the aggregate wealth in the economy. In other words, profitable investment opportunities resulting from inefficient markets (i.e. μ −μ large) erode if the investor accumulates too much wealth. 
The Alpha
The "alpha" is one of the most used buzzwords in the finance jargon. It measures the deviation of mean asset returns from the security market line. Investment funds, in particular hedge funds, claim to generate a positive alpha in order to attract assets under management. However, so far there is no theory that explains the existence of a nonzero alpha. A nonzero alpha is in contradiction to the standard CAPM with homogenous beliefs. Under homogenous and correct beliefs, everyone holds the market portfolio and hence, each asset generates an alpha of zero. To see this define the (ex post) alpha of asset k bŷ 
for all k by Proposition 2.1. Hence, if average expectations differ from true expectations,μ =μ, typically there will exist k such thatα k =ᾱ k = 0 and hence there will exist a portfolio of risky assetsλ, which generates a positive alpha, i.e. kλ kαk > 0.
Thus, our CAPM model with heterogenous expectations can explain the existence of a nonzero alpha in equilibrium. However, it will turn out that the hunt for alpha opportunities is a zero sum game and that alpha opportunities erode whenever the investor accumulates too much wealth in the economy. Moreover, we will argue that a positive alpha is not necessarily a good criterion for active portfolio management. Hence, our model on the one hand provides a thorough foundation for the alpha and on the other hand casts serious doubt on its use in practical financial decisions.
In order to derive these results we define the ex post or true alpha of investor 
Hence, since w j f > 0 for all j, an investor i can generate a positive alpha if and only if there is another investor j who generates a negative alpha. We state this zero sum game property in the following proposition. Hence,λ
